Sélectionner une page

DANS QUELLE MESURE FAUT-IL RÉVISER LA NOTION DE CRUAUTÉ ?

Cahiers N°28 - RRJ 2014-5

Stefan GOLTZBERG

Chercheur à l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit

Abstract

I address the question of the revision of legal concepts, more particularly that of cruelty, which is a thick concept. Many legal texts forbid cruel punishments but they often don’t make explicit what exactly is meant or referred to by cruel punishments. The judge whose approach is dynamic will be happy to revise legal concepts like cruelty if need be. But what about the originalist judge, who sets out to stick to the original meaning that the words (like cruel) bore when the normative text was adopted ? Scalia and Garner seem to say that a revision is not admissible. Yet a distinction between meaning-originalism and conception-originalism might lead to another answer. According to John Perry, if you want to be an originalist, you can only be a meaning-originalist. Scalia and Garner happen to subscribe to this meaning-originalism. By contrast, a conception-originalism is, according to Perry, inadmissible and yet Scalia and Garner seem to shift to that view when it comes to some questions related to the revision of legal concepts such as cruel punishments.

Introduction
L’opposition n’est pas totale
Du refus de l’originalisme à l’interprétation dynamique.
Une défense de l’originalisme
Perry ou la philosophie du langage se penchant sur l’originalisme de Scalia
Share This
Aller au contenu principal